What is the Moral argument for the existence of God?

If "it has been keenly felt by those who attempt to defend this doctrine of the spiritual life, that they have nothing more to oppose to the rationalistic view than the ipse dixit of revelation" (p. 66), yet since the natural laws "are great lines running not only through the world, but, as we now know, through the universe, reducing it like parallels of latitude to intelligent order" (p. 6), — surely that part of the spiritual region which is nearest to us should be the most distinctly marked out by these lines! But no, natural laws, it appears, are even of less use to us here than the ipse dixit of revelation (not that our author on his own part questions the adequacy of revelation; still he should be consistent with his theory), for, "No secular theory of personal continuance, as even Butler acknowledges, does not equally demand the eternity of the brute" (p. 226). This however I cannot agree with; it has always seemed to me that there is much, which strongly tends to the conclusion that man has an immortal soul, I mean apart from revelation. Our own existence is a proof that there is a God, our knowledge of good and evil, is a proof that we are accountable to Him. Adjudication is clearly not in this world, and therefore is to be in the next. This however is the reasoning of natural religion, which we fully own and accept, as we do revealed religion, admitting that the latter cannot be put on a demonstrable basis. He can give no proof of the immortality of the soul, and little as, even of the existence of a spiritual world; for he says, "at the same time, although attempting no philosophical proof of the existence of a spiritual life and a spiritual world, we are not without hope that the general line of thought here may be useful to some who are honestly inquiring in these directions" (p. 26).

On this subject the speculations of men's minds are numerous in these days, but for the most part all such seem to me to proceed on principles which are exactly the reverse of the truth. There are in the main two distinct directions in which these speculations are found to run. In pursuance of the first of these men seek to lessen the importance of conscience by trying to make out that the knowledge of right and wrong is in us a mere matter of thought, because our judgment of what is right and what is wrong is entirely the result of education or of prejudice. This, when examined, resolves itself plainly into a denial that there is morality, or an abstract moral standard, and as a necessary consequence denies an absolute standard of morals, that is, denies God. It is well to look the full result in the face, and it would be far better for all if men in general did so, and spoke plainly out, so that all might know what is the true issue before them. Concealment is certainly not of "the truth," whether it is voluntary or involuntary, as far as man is concerned. If we are to deny God and morals, then we know what is before us, and must prepare to see the world deluged in violence and corruption, such as have in degree prevailed wherever the "reason" which teaches these doctrines has held sway, and that even of late years.

I do not overstate the result. For granting that conscience may be much influenced by education, and therefore, putting aside for the moment the consideration of what is judged right or wrong, there plainly remains the existence in men of the power or capacity of discernment of these opposite qualities, even though things wrong may be put for right, and vice versa. As then the capacity to discern these essential qualities exists, the question undoubtedly is, Is there a standard of abstract right and wrong, of morals, by which our ideas derived from education or habit are to be tested? It will not do to say because, with the Spartans, what we call stealing was a virtue, or because the Corinthians deified what we know as lust, or because among savage people what we are taught to call murder is commended, that therefore theft and adultery and murder exist only as relative ideas in our minds. This is really, as I have said, to deny the existence of virtue or goodness, either in the abstract, or absolutely in God. Man's moral nature, except when degraded, scouts the absurdity, and demands as a necessity the existence of abstract moral virtue, and, not only so, but insists that there must also be a perfect and absolute measure of that in God Himself. And therefore conscience leads us directly to the fact of having to do with Him.

How is it that the intelligent creation has been placed upon these moral foundations? Are we to be taught nothing regarding God by all this? How and why is it, that such a principle is found in the minds of men? Why have we been set in relationship with one another, so that such obligations exist? The thought of righteousness, truth, love and peace is found in the hearts of men, and they are the principles upon which relationships with one another are established. Why is this? Could not another order of things have been established, where such principles would have been unknown?

Conjoined with this also, or a component part of the same instinct, there is the sense of moral accountability indelibly imprinted on the heart of every man. This is so plainly the case that no denial is possible. It is so realised to be part and parcel of our very nature as men to feel accountable for thoughts entertained and actions performed. We can understand no normal human being without it, and as matter of fact we find none. Man is essentially a moral creature, from the beginning was so. A consciousness of responsibility, dim it may be, or uncertain to whom it refers, pervades the mind of even the most benighted, however distorted his ideas of the unknown Supreme may be.

In every human soul, too, scripture testifies, since the fruit of the forbidden tree in Eden was partaken of, the voice of conscience makes itself heard. "Knowing good and evil describes the new moral outlook of man in his fallen state, come under the power of evil now, alas! though his "conscience bearing witness" as we read in Rom. 2:15 — not in regard to Jews, not in that sphere where the light of revealed-truth shone, but among "those of the nations," "the heathen." Instances of commendable ethics among the Gentiles, rare enough no doubt, were sometimes in evidence. This does not prove, however, "the law" to be "written on their hearts." It is "the work of the law" of which this is affirmed, conscience bearing corroborative witness therewith. The thoughts of accusation or extenuation that flit across such dark minds, show them capable, inherently so, of moral exercise, and evidence clearly enough the sense of moral accountability, and the witness of conscience to be, both of them, universal features. All this in its own way we must allow is testimony to the existence of God.

"We challenge the world to prove," writes Dr. Hodge, "that mankind are destitute of the idea of 'right,' of 'oughtness,' or of 'justice'; the idea of moral obligation is ultimate and independent, and therefore it is intrinsically supreme and absolute."

We have thus one personal God - "I am," supreme, absolutely free, omniscient, omnipotent, wise, the Creator. These are, so to speak, natural attributes; moral ones are righteous, holy, good; known to man not by ideas or thinking, which is impossible, for then man's mind would be at least the equal of God, that is, He would not be God at all; but by conscience, or the knowledge of good and evil, the proofs in the creation around us of creative power and wisdom, and in spite of the undeniable, utter degradation of man, in corruption and violence, and the monstrous deities into which he had merged it, the idea of God, the abiding sense of unity, supremacy, absolute godhead, everywhere found.

But supposing this sense of right and wrong in man, and that it is connected with the relationships in which we stand, I do hold that God loves righteousness and hates iniquity, because I intrinsically know right and wrong, but right and wrong being apprehended in the relationship, God is supreme to my mind; that is the first of rights. He is God, as much as my father is my father, and I own subjection to Him as God. I do say, He must be righteous, for that is the expression of acting on what is right and good in the relationships in which He has placed others, as far as consistent with supremacy and righteousness. But this is not supremacy of conscience, as if I were judge, and my measure of right and wrong, or my discernment of it perfect; but that I do conclude from right and wrong abstractedly to right in God, but at the same time to supremacy and perfection as the point I start from. One must not confound the measure of right and wrong with the sense of it. To speak of the supremacy of conscience, is to assume that its measure is perfect and adequate, not obligation under it. When I judge God or any one, I take a measure to judge by, and may misjudge from the state of my own mind. That is not conscience. Conscience with God recognises authority also over it, and supreme authority, or God is not recognised at all, and that is simply atheism. What these modern infidels claim - is to make their consciences the measure of right and wrong. This is false and grossly pretentious, and destroys the nature of God, and right as regards Him.

Page 37. 'Undoubtedly, as the primary element in this idea, must be placed the intellect, or rational nature of the soul in man; the power or capacity of mind, which enabled him in discernment to rise above the impressions of sense. Without such a faculty, there had been wanting the essential ground of moral obligation; man could not be the subject either of praise or of blame; for he should have been incapable of so distinguishing between the true and the false, the right and the wrong, and so appreciating the reasons which ought to make the one rather than the other the object of one's desire and choice, as to render him responsible for his conduct. In God this property exists in absolute perfection.' God had it always, he says, and so man must.

Besides, the application of the moral law to God as law is impossible, whether we take it as love to God or your neighbour, or the prohibition of evil, as is evident. But it is not because i the moral law is not absolute, that is, above human thoughts. Such reasoning is just the fruit of not getting beyond thought (Mansel's and Kant's error here).

49 Morality, or moral obligation, is in the nature of all relations which imply a claim; it is the bond flowing from them. That man has had all manner of rules is true; but when God says, "The man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil," it certainly implies that right and wrong was of an absolute nature. But it is the application of a law which makes obligatory a course imposed by authority (though it may be moral too). The knowledge of good and evil is the perception of it in itself, without a law or its being imposed. God does know, doubtless, good and evil according to the perfection of His own nature. But it is a condition of His nature to discern it; it was not of Adam's before his fall. He was innocent; he enjoyed God's goodness unsuspectingly, and did nothing else. There was no occasion to discern, nor capacity to do so. In the fall he acquired this capacity. He could now say, This is good and that evil; but he was under sin.

That moral law is excellent and absolute, because we discern good and evil, is a mistaken way of putting it. What we have is a capacity to discern right and wrong, not a law, but a moral condition of my mind. But, on the other hand, it is not subject to forms of thought, because it is not a question of thought. It is in the nature of the relationship; it is conscience, and not thought; it may be in us misled by thought.

Has man, then, no thought of God at all? Not so. He cannot judge by his mind, but he has the knowledge of good and evil - conscience. It may be corrupted, perverted, hardened, but he makes the difference of right and wrong. Scripture shews us he got this by the fall, and so as under sin. Still it brings in God, saying "The man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil." It is not a law, a rule from without, imposed, but what is intrinsic (in man). He says, That is a good thing, that a bad one; and he concludes at once, God cannot approve a wrong thing, nor condemn a good thing. A man may, from passions, education, habit, have a very wrong measure of right and wrong; and demon-gods may make him put evil for good, and good for evil; but he makes the difference, and the sense of right or wrong in itself leads him to attribute right to God, and not wrong. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"