What is subjectivism?

There is a kind of metaphysical infidelity which endeavours to substitute "subjective revelation," that is, consciousness of truth in the soul, for objective revelation, that is, the Bible. So that a man's own spiritual intuition and convictions are to take the place, and usurp the authority, of the word of God. This may be called "inward light," or even the name of the Spirit of God may be applied to it. But being apart from and independent of the word of God, it is only delusion. Subjective revelation, even if a reality and not a delusion, could never be the standard of truth. For if the whole word of God could be contained by any one mind and divinely understood, something more is needed to make the convictions of one authoritative for another. To accept them as authority is putting man in the place of God. But if subjective revelation was in each living man (if not in each, to some it must be objective), each one would be his own authority, his own standard of truth. And what if these "Authorities" clashed? Two things would inevitably result: first, that man would believe in himself, would worship his own convictions, would please himself, he would be his own god, and therefore an idolater, and as not believing in God, rejecting His word, would be also an infidel; the second result would be that Truth, as such, would be lost. Such a tide of conflicting notions, absurd opinions would flow over the world, that every landmark would be submerged, and the world of ideas (if we are allowed such a term) would be as the earth once was "without form and void." To talk of Revelation as being subjective so as to deny the inspiration of the Bible is only common infidelity in a deistic guise.

Nor is this all. If people could be found marked only by these characteristics, it is doubtful if the term “mystic” could be properly applied to them. The essence of mysticism lies in this, that the seat of authority is transferred in the mind of the mystic from the external Word of God to the spiritual consciousness — the “spiritual man” — internal to themselves. Homage of quite an orthodox kind may be verbally rendered to the Scriptures, and yet they may be largely displaced. The spiritual conception of the mystic, who flatters himself that he is indeed a spiritual man, are all important to him. He soars above and beyond the Scripture. Its letter he disdains, even if he does not speak against it. It has little or no restraining effect upon the flights of his imagination. He quotes it of course, but only as supporting or illustrating or adorning his own conceptions of truth. His conceptions become the primary thing on which the main emphasis must be laid. Scripture must be interpreted in the light of those conceptions, and its words become of secondary importance.

Volume 1, chapter 34, etc. The whole ground of rationalism is false - here it takes the subjective state of men, not evidence, as the test of truth; see also page 101. But page 102 is mere positivism - "We believe what we have experienced"; but nothing can be more degrading, nor can anything be more illogical, or at any rate unreasonable than this, because it assumes our material experience to be the measure of everything, whereas even our mental experience - our own bodies prove the contrary, i.e., the action of what is not material on matter. A woman faints when she hears her son is crushed - what does that? My heart beats - what keeps it going? Nor is it true that because I believe in devils, that I am "nervously excited" if I adequately believe in other things - he admits it was not so when the Church's power was believed. When all was doubted, then this dread of devils came in; this is to be noted.

The great blunder of Schleiermacher, and the source of the worst infidelity now, is that he has taken the Holy Ghost's work in us - very likely in himself - for intuition, or specially collective Christian consciousness. He made divine teaching, in which case it is real, to be a title of human judgment on what the Holy Ghost gave. This is, I suspect, the key to the whole system, itself probably the fruit of Kantian philosophy and its offsets. The whole hangs on the church's not believing in the positive operation of the Holy Ghost. For all that Scherer and Bunsen, etc., pretend on their best side is simply Schleiermacher. Thus the Bible is Christian consciousness then: we judge it by Christian consciousness now. Hence it is, as Scherer says, the mere history of partial apprehension of truth; and of course, as every philosopher trusts himself, we judge scripture. That is, there is no revelation; for revelation must have authority or is false. Be it that the church was before the New Testament and the latter written for believers; yet the question is not thereby touched, whether it was not written by the power and direct inspiration of the Holy Ghost to give certainty and a divine record of those things in which they had been instructed. If the consciousness of believers was there, it was not to reproduce this but something else. It was to confirm and correct theirs by a divine statement of it, and give a sure record of that divinely-taught truth. Thus its being given to believers is, as far as it goes, a proof that it was not merely the expression of religious consciousness as then developed.

I do not overstate the result. For granting that conscience may be much influenced by education, and therefore, putting aside for the moment the consideration of what is judged right or wrong, there plainly remains the existence in men of the power or capacity of discernment of these opposite qualities, even though things wrong may be put for right, and vice versa. As then the capacity to discern these essential qualities exists, the question undoubtedly is, Is there a standard of abstract right and wrong, of morals, by which our ideas derived from education or habit are to be tested? It will not do to say because, with the Spartans, what we call stealing was a virtue, or because the Corinthians deified what we know as lust, or because among savage people what we are taught to call murder is commended, that therefore theft and adultery and murder exist only as relative ideas in our minds. This is really, as I have said, to deny the existence of virtue or goodness, either in the abstract, or absolutely in God. Man's moral nature, except when degraded, scouts the absurdity, and demands as a necessity the existence of abstract moral virtue, and, not only so, but insists that there must also be a perfect and absolute measure of that in God Himself. And therefore conscience leads us directly to the fact of having to do with Him.

This feature is very strongly emphasized. The great idea running through these mystical publications is the ALL-importance of the subjective as contrasted with the objective. This is elaborated and reiterated in many ways with great expenditure of words, consequently the only difficulty is to find it expressed in sufficiently compact form for quotation.

The author we have just quoted, however, wishes us to believe that if we are not subjectively in thoroughgoing accord with the objective reality, then to us the objective reality is “null and void,” i.e., nothing and empty, of neither force nor meaning. Truly, as we have said, the objective reality disappears, quite eclipsed by the overpowering importance of the subjective impression.

I have been asked to explain these terms which are so often used and so little understood. I do not know any terms that could be substituted for them, and certainly it is of the utmost importance that we should understand what they represent, and that we should keep objective truth and the subjective effect of it in their proper, relative places. The objective side of the truth is that which is presented to faith; it gives faith an object outside oneself. The subjective side is the effect that that objective truth has upon one's soul; it is what is done in us by the Holy Spirit. We become the subjects of His work, and thus an answer is produced in us to the truth presented objectively to our faith. For instance: “God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (John 3:16), is the objective; “The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us,” is the subjective.

I have been asked to explain these terms which are so often used and so little understood. I do not know any terms that could be substituted for them, and certainly it is of the utmost importance that we should understand what they represent, and that we should keep objective truth and the subjective effect of it in their proper, relative places. The objective side of the truth is that which is presented to faith; it gives faith an object outside oneself. The subjective side is the effect that that objective truth has upon one's soul; it is what is done in us by the Holy Spirit. We become the subjects of His work, and thus an answer is produced in us to the truth presented objectively to our faith. For instance: "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believes in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John 3:16), is the objective; "The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given to us," is the subjective.

But now with reference to our second vessel and to the illustration it supplies. The compass was wanting. The chart and helm were in good working order. Truth was on board, so far, at least, as the mere possession of it was concerned. There was “the knowledge of the truth” (see Heb. 10:26) and the helm of conscience; but, alas, the compass of faith—that which is a sine qua non—that without which, in every sense, “it is impossible to please God”—that which alone can justify in His sight or put the soul in possession of salvation was wanting. Without it destruction is inevitable. “He that believes not shall be damned;” and therefore conscience however upright, and head-knowledge however clear, either separately or together, fail to save. “To live up to one’s conscience” is a popular idea of the way of salvation! But if conscience should fail to apprehend the mind of God, is every sinner who, forsooth, makes a standard of his own individual conscience—his own idea of right and wrong—his own supposition of what becomes God, is every, such sinner, I say, to find a place in heaven? Truly many heavens would be needed to meet the many different standards of right and wrong. Suppose that a sinner in all good conscience should commit murder, should slay his fellow creatures in cold blood and plead conscience—for so did Saul of Tarsus—what a state of things we should run into!!