What is natural law?

Natural Law is simply the operation of the will of God in any particular case of nature, as carried into effect by His own power; and the whole creation is divided into two distinct departments, viz. the natural, physical or visible, and the spiritual, immaterial and invisible; in each of which there are sub-systems of law, wheel within wheel, each department forming an harmonious system within itself, and all tending towards a moral end and object, the glory of God. Our author, in a passage to be presently quoted, denies that there can be analogy between laws; he maintains that between phenomena there is analogy, between laws there is not analogy but identity (p. 11), or continuity, (p. 76). I question how far this dictum can be accepted, even when the phenomena all belong to the same order of things, i.e. when they are all physical, or all spiritual; but I am perfectly certain it cannot apply where they are of different orders, i.e. one set physical, and another set spiritual: in such a case there is neither identity nor continuity. For instance, I should not myself say that the law of magnetic attractions and repulsions is the same as that of gravitation, though, as regards the mere abstract and mathematical mode of expression, it can be expressed in the same manner. We may have attraction or repulsion in the former case, attraction only, in the latter. So, the rate at which a static charge of electricity. is dissipated, resembles that at which a hot body cools, as expressed by Newton's law of cooling; yet I could not say it is the same law. There is analogy rather than identity in these cases. Take again the law of induction, as we have it in natural philosophy, or in pure mathematics. There is analogy but not identity between them. But these instances are, so to speak, generically the same, i.e. they are all of the physical order; and hence, if people choose to call these laws the same, at least no harm is done. Now unquestionably God has seen good to teach us spiritual truth by figurative language, language borrowed from the natural world (how else could we learn?). But to regard these spiritual truths simply as phenomena, to bind them together into a law, and then to assert that there is identity and continuity (not analogy) between this so-called law, and natural law, is to falsify the character of the spiritual, being a profane intrusion into the spiritual sphere, and ignores (in principle, if not intentionally) the personal will and operation of God acting in grace. The place and application which our author gives to law is logically a denial also of miracle, and here again consistency is altogether on the side of thorough-going infidelity.

98 But it is said, we confound all laws together. I take it as the word of God does. That law is not the way of righteousness or sanctification, nor of obedience. Paul does not even say the law. Law came in by the by (νόμος παρεισῆλθε), that system and way of dealing on God's part. He carefully distinguishes men under law, and men not under law — without it; he alludes to Adam as under a law, Israel also; whereas people between them are on a different ground: so all Gentiles, having no law (νόμον); so Christians. I know that great pains are taken to undo his words, and shew they must have had some law, though the apostle declares they have none, and perish without it, instead of being judged by the one which was given. I know that it is urged they were a law to themselves where they had none, because they had a conscience; but this is only to prove that actual righteousness by conscience is better than the having a law and breaking it; that working good was better than having a law, if it was broken. Scripture contrasts being under law and being without law, and does not know these speculations on it. What it calls law as absolutely as words can make it, it declares the Gentiles to be without (μὴ ἔχοντες νόμον), having no law at all. It does say every one has a conscience which tells him of right and wrong. They are without law — χωρὶς νόμον. They are inexcusable, from natural proofs of God, and as giving up God when they knew Him. But they are not proved guilty by any law they were under; but it is declared, having sinned without law (ἀνόμως), they will perish without law — while others have sinned under law, and will be judged by it. The sense in which scripture says they were without law and had none, in that sense I believe and say it. Nothing can be more absolute. The reasonings of men as to it are all inventions not found in scripture. What scripture calls law, Gentiles and Christians are not under. I know passages are quoted to shew that they must be, in spite of what scripture says. I shall refer to these. Ignorance of Greek can hardly excuse the use of some of them, where positive scriptures are so plain.

Testimony is another source of knowledge, and, in moral things, conscience, but in what is subject to man (testimony may reveal what is not, conscience has nothing to do with it). We learn what is natural by experience, because the constancy of sequence is only so known by human knowledge - that is Science; God even has been pleased so to subject Himself, not to mind, but to human knowledge - not a law, or sequence, any such inference may fail - "hereby know we love, because he laid down his life for us"; so that law, or an imposed uniform rule, is only so known.

I need not follow the mass of useless verbiage in the controversy between Mill and Dr. Whewell. Mill sums it up in one sentence as to Kepler, but shews himself wrong therein; for, as is evident, Kepler's law was an induction, only one ready-made for him in the necessary rules of an ellipse. Having found a number of places and movements of Mars, he inferred all the rest: only the inference was ready-made for him. But as to the question of nature itself, what is in Mill (ground of induction) and Whately is vague and unsatisfactory, though there is a general presentiment of truth in it. Nature and its uniformity come up in three distinct ways. First, uniformity of relative existence, that is, of what is always true in nature as it subsists, as space and form, mathematical induction, which is really merely discovery of what is constantly so. Secondly, the effects of power in nature, which may or may not operate constantly, as gravitation or certain chemical affinities or effects. Thirdly, subjection to some law or power which operates universally. The second is probably the law of nature. I do not conclude because John and Peter have died that all will. Abel's death by violence, and all men's, save eight, by the flood, could not have proved it, because it was not the course of nature that all would have died by nature; but I conclude that John and Peter will die because all have. My reason is that the universality of it, without other external cause, makes it a law of man's nature; but as it is not in the subject itself apparently, but subjection to a law of necessity, I must shew its universality in the natural course of things, which practically proves its necessity in every cause. Yet it is not proof, that is, certainty, though quasi-certainty. He who believes scripture knows we shall not all die. It is what in a person or being in his normal state is contrary to his nature, for he lives. He is subjected to it, he may be even violently. Hence I can only conclude while that subjection continues. But in chemical affinities or gravitation it is in its normal state that it so acts; it is its nature. Seeing this, namely it is its nature, the law of it if you please, I reckon on its doing so in all cases, because it is its nature. This may be both learned and confirmed by observation, and, no doubt, possibly the generalisation induced; but from one clear adequate instance or many I have its nature.

The word 'law' is also used for a fixed and unvarying principle such as 'a law of nature:' thus we read of the 'law of faith,' 'law of sin,' 'law of righteousness,' 'law of the Spirit of life,' etc.; cf. Rom. 7:21.

Nature is also a term descriptive of the vast system of created things around us, to each part of which the Creator has given not only its existence, but its use, its order, its increase, its decay — often called 'the laws of nature' — the laws which govern each and which constitute its propriety. Thus nature teaches that a man should not have long hair, 1 Cor. 11:14; and a multitude of other things that are of God's order in creation.

105 "Again, the rule of voluntary agents on earth is the sentence which reason giveth concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do." (Chap. 8:1.) Certain things, he says, are evidently good. "Notwithstanding such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." (Chap. 8:4.) Now here it is not mere conscience acquired at the fall, but man's moral power and capacity of reason. "The heathens," he says, "shewed this principle by making Themis, which we call 'right,' the daughter of heaven and earth." (Chap. 8:5.) "So," he says, "by degrees of discourse the minds of men, natural men, have attained to know not only that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisdom, and other properties that God hath, and how all things depend on Him. Hence," he says, "they have learnt to pray to Him, and what amounts to the first great commandment to which Christ refers. So of the second, the like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is their duty no less to love others than themselves. And the law of reason, or human nature, is that which men by discourse of natural reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions." (Sec. 7.) "As to evil," he says, "if it be demanded why so many thousands of men notwithstanding have been ignorant of even principal moral duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sin, I deny not but lewd and wicked custom, beginning perhaps at the first among a few, afterwards spreading … may be of force even in plain things to smother the light of natural understanding." (Sec. 8.)

Clearly it is not the will, for conscience frequently pushes its way in opposition to the will. Neither is it reason, for while a man's reason will demonstrate to him that a given course of action will work him injury, yet his conscience will impel him forwards to do the right thing, even to the wronging of himself. It is not a conclusion arrived at in the mind upon weighing over the right and wrong of a question. Conscience is the moral sense of right and wrong which is innate to man. It is as much a part of his present being as his reason or his will. We may describe conscience as the eye of man's moral being, or liken it to a voice within his breast commanding him concerning right and wrong.

Conscience is not a faculty in man, enabling him to know abstractedly what is right and wrong, but, given the law of right and wrong, conscience appeals to man according to the precepts of the law he knows. Conscience needs instructing, it does not instruct; and according as the conscience is faithfully instructed, so will its utterances be more or less just. In proportion as this eye is tutored will be the truthfulness of its perceptions.

49 Morality, or moral obligation, is in the nature of all relations which imply a claim; it is the bond flowing from them. That man has had all manner of rules is true; but when God says, "The man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil," it certainly implies that right and wrong was of an absolute nature. But it is the application of a law which makes obligatory a course imposed by authority (though it may be moral too). The knowledge of good and evil is the perception of it in itself, without a law or its being imposed. God does know, doubtless, good and evil according to the perfection of His own nature. But it is a condition of His nature to discern it; it was not of Adam's before his fall. He was innocent; he enjoyed God's goodness unsuspectingly, and did nothing else. There was no occasion to discern, nor capacity to do so. In the fall he acquired this capacity. He could now say, This is good and that evil; but he was under sin.

That moral law is excellent and absolute, because we discern good and evil, is a mistaken way of putting it. What we have is a capacity to discern right and wrong, not a law, but a moral condition of my mind. But, on the other hand, it is not subject to forms of thought, because it is not a question of thought. It is in the nature of the relationship; it is conscience, and not thought; it may be in us misled by thought.

The law is not the transcript of the divine character. It is the perfect rule for a creature, and cannot therefore, in the nature of things, apply to God Himself, because He is not in the relationship of a creature, and law is the expression of what becomes these relationships. If it is the expression of what we owe to God, it cannot be that of God's character. Adam was put under a law which required no knowledge in his mind of what was good and evil, or right and wrong in itself. There was no evil in eating the forbidden fruit, save as it was prohibited. It was not good or evil in itself: he acquired the knowledge of good and evil by eating it. The introduction of sin and conscience came together. God did not allow man to go out as a sinner from Paradise to commence this world without carrying a conscience with him. It may have been corrupted — hardened; but it is there to be corrupted and hardened. Hence the apostle reasons as to the Gentiles on the ground of conscience, though not on that only; but he speaks of no law written on the Gentiles' heart. If that were so, they would be under the new covenant. It is not the law, but the particular work which their natural conscience approves or reproves, that is written on their hearts, a work found in the law too.