What is libertarian free will?

It does not appear that Pelagius was animated by any desire to form a new doctrinal system, but rather to oppose what he considered moral indolence, and a worldly spirit among his brethren. Hence he maintained that man possessed inherent power for doing the will of God, and for reaching the highest degree of holiness. In this way his theological views were to a great extent formed and determined. But utterly false as they are, they were only consistent with his rigid asceticism, and its native fruit. As scripture undeniably refers all good in man to the grace of God, Pelagius too, in a sense of his own, acknowledges this; but his ideas of divine grace were really nothing more than outward means to call forth man's efforts: a work of heavenly grace in the heart, and the operations of the Holy Spirit he did not think were needed. This led him to teach that the sin of our first parents had injured no one but themselves, that man is now born as innocent as Adam was when God created him, and possessed of the same moral power and purity. These doctrines, and such as are connected with them, especially the idea of man's free will — "an unbiassed power of choosing between good and evil," Pelagius and his colleague, Celestius, secretly disseminated in Rome, Sicily, Africa, and Palestine; but, excepting in the East, the novel opinions were generally condemned. There, John, bishop of Jerusalem, who considered the doctrines of Pelagius as agreeing with the opinions of Origen, to which John was attached, patronised Pelagius, allowing him to profess his sentiments freely, and to gather disciples.*

All men speak about freewill is nonsense - free and will do not go together - there is no will till a person is decided and determined. Man is perfectly free to will, as far as constraint by another goes; in truth, as far as man's faculties go, he cannot be otherwise, i.e., it is his own will where he has one - his body, his acts may be constrained, and fear may make him will as other inclinations would not have led him, but his will as will is always his own. The moral part of the matter does not lie there, save as having one's own will is sin, i.e., determining without reference to God, instead of obeying - the claim of independency to have a right to act supremely, without reference to another having authority over us - it is what determines the will, and makes it what is called "free," i.e., our own, in which sin lies - the power of such and such things over the heart. I admit this alleged freedom, i.e., the pretension to be independent of God, to be the very principle of sin - it is rejection of God and His authority, but the ally of this is "pleasant to the eyes, good for food, a tree to be desired," etc. - confidence in God making us happy lost, and so objects desired, and then will in activity. Only, lust having thus come in when will is set right, the lusts remain as a hindrance, and power is needed to deliver. Does not this amount to the will not being a proper faculty of the soul at all? Something existing, even when inert? Will is "I" in the determination of activity - there is none when it is not determined; when choice is made, then there is will (i.e., may be), the lust or desire, which has gained the mastery over "I," leads "I" to intentional activity towards the object desired. And it is the same in God, only the objects of intentional activity are not, of course, any desire which moves Him in the object - save Christ - but the creatures of His own wisdom. He is Author from Himself.

43 As regards personality, the conscious "I" is personality, though it cannot explain by reason in what it consists; but absolute dependence on God destroying personal freedom is all confusion. Dependence is equivocal. It means that I must derive existence and all here - more, have all from Him, or that I feel dependent on Him - look to Him. All this leaves out will, as contrasted with the obligation of obedience. Most of what is called personal freedom is simply sanction of sin. I ought always to obey - "Lo, I come to do thy will" was Christ's uniform and sole motive. If freedom means that God does not purpose evil or hinder good, it is quite true; but if it means a right to have a will of one's own, it is sin - atheism. A man being really set to choose between evil and good (he may be, for trial to shew him what he is) is alike horrible and absurd; because it supposes the good and evil to be outside, and himself neither. If he is one or other in disposition, the choice is there. To have a fair choice, he must be personally indifferent; but to be in a state of indifference to good and evil is perfectly horrible. If a man has an inclination, his choice is not free: a free will is rank nonsense morally; because, if he have a will, he wills something. God can will to create. But will in moral things means either self-will, which is sin (for we ought to obey); or an inclination to something, which is really a choice made as far as will goes. In truth it is never so. Man was set in good, though not externally forced to remain so. He first exercised his will - free-will, morally speaking - in eating the forbidden fruit, and was therein and thereby lost, and since then he has been inclined to evil. Dependence lies in this - that a creature must depend on God. He does so joyfully in perfect good, and on whom it comes has the claim when he knows God. Independence in will (there cannot be in fact), and disobedience, its fruit, are the condition of the old man. Dependence and obedience are the characteristics of the new man - of Christ. Save what grace works, God does leave the will free; but it tends in its nature away from God; because it is will. And the not looking to God must have an object below man. That wretched freedom man has, and perseveres in it but for grace, and resists the motives of grace, because it calls to God, to dependence and obedience of heart. And will wills itself: only one can be born of God, and have a new nature - Christ as our life, and so be a new creature.

But "free" needs to be examined; willkuhr (absolute will) and wahl (choice) are given as the elements of freedom or freewill, but it is said it is not an indifference which supposes no inclination more to one than another. Freedom, it is said, is in not being compelled, and in taking counsel and choosing. Now the absence of compulsion is clear, but choice is another thing.

First, what is will? I believe nothing more than the exclusion of other inclinations by one predominate one. This exclusion may come from strength of passion, or a superior motive - there may be an abnegation of will to obey another, recognising his authority, but will is only a predominant inclination; but it has no moral character where there is not the knowledge of good and evil. Thus, an animal gratifying its lusts - there is no relation violated, though violence may now be come in. How far then has arbitrary self originated choice? It is said it is not indifference - there must be inclination - this is not then simple self-originated choice. I choose within a sphere subjected to me - out of it, I cannot; I may desire, which may prove my moral state, but I cannot actually choose. But in that order of things, mentally subjected to me, at least, either it is rightly subjected or not; if rightly, I am a creature - it is by the will of another. So it was in Adam's case in innocence - he was set to dress the garden, and keep it, he did so freely, but according to the order of his mind, and the garden's order - so that self-will, i.e., a determination or desire was not in exercise - he did what had to be done according to the perfect order of his own mind, and it was delight because it was the order of his mind, in which it worked freely without a craving of desire. Now that tests have come in, it is another thing; will is now desire appropriating something to self, at least mentally.

270 Now to have will free, clearly there must be no compulsion - I say, I need not do it, I am not obliged; but when we speak of will or choice (willkuhr) I have clearly cast off God - am not subject to Him, i.e., the sole, true, determining motive for creature will is wanting, and all is really evil. But if I am already inclined, I am on the way to a determination, and in fact determined, unless some other inclination, more powerful, comes in - ease, or passion, or pleasing some one. If I have only the first inclination, my will goes that way - my will is formed, not self-originated. I may by conscience see I ought to do so, and intend to do it, when the predominant motive is not there (for I admit conscience - knowledge of right and wrong in all), but when the motives come to act, then the will is formed - if I am absolutely indifferent, no will takes place; if I am not, the will is determined, saving a more powerful motive; thus choice and self-originated will is a mistake. When I say "he has a very strong will," it is another thing - it is carrying out my will by firmness of purpose against other men's opposition. Take three objects, A., B. and C. I do not understand why it should be said that if we are equally inclined to A., B. and C., we cannot be to A. and not A. It is not so, if inclined only to A. and B., for in that case I am equally inclined to take A., and B. that is not A. But this supposes that I am forced to take one or another as incompatible, else the inclination would be to both. If I must choose, the A., and not A. have equal power - not in A. by itself, for if I am inclined to A., I cannot be inclined at all to not A.; but when another thing I am inclined to involves not A., I am not directly or positively, but as a mere consequence equally disposed to not A. Now if it is A. or B. or C. it is the same thing, because each is compared with each, and one loses the other two in any case, and my positive will can only be governed by one. But if it is A. or B. and C., and I am inclined to each individual equally, my will is formed by the two at once, because the predominant inclination is two to one - yet it fixes on no particular two, so that it comes to the same thing, unless accidentally determined.

271 I admit therefore liberty of will as far as freedom from compulsion - I am free to will; my will is never free - will is a determined purpose. But to say that an inclined will is not formed by what inclines it, is false upon the face of it. If nothing acts upon it to incline it there is no will at all - there is indifference, i.e., no will. A nature inclined to good is perfectly free in obeying - it is what is called the law of liberty; but a nature indifferent to good and evil, or inclined to the latter, cannot choose the good - it is indifferent to it, or inclined the other way. If personal persuasion, or terror lead it to the good, it has not chosen the good, but been formed by the influencing motive - you cannot say indifferent, for then there can be no choice - if you say preference, or inclination one way, the choice is already made.

I may be told that I may be inclined to a given thing, and conscience arrests me. Very right; but then I am not free to choose, but bound and rightly bound. Man being governed by motives, all may be and is foreknown, he being perfectly free, constrained to nothing - if absolutely originated, it would be hard to say so - but I do not believe man capable of originating anything.

But dismissing this folly and evil, is it true that "free" is consistent with "will"? or are they not as inconsistent as "Catholic" with "Roman," or Protestant rights with Christian obedience? Is there will till a man is determined?

When man was set innocent in Eden, he had a sphere placed under him and was free to act there as lord of all given him by God, his obedience tested by a single restraint, which thrown off brought in death on him and all his subjected realm. It was no question of the knowledge of good and evil in a fallen world, with all the moral play which this involves. Conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity, I am begotten again by the word of truth, and now live of a divine life, to do God's will, not mine. The christian has a nature corresponding with the order in which he stands, and owns gladly his obligation to do God's will. This is the law of liberty of which the Epistle of James speaks. The believer is free to serve God, delivered from his old bondage whatever it might be; yet is he brought and bound to do, not his own will, but God's, which is ever the will of the new man. Free to choose is all false. It was not Adam's case, where there was no conflict of evil with good; it is not in ours. Fallen unconverted man has a will of his own to act independently of God and His word: this is sin. It is lawlessness, law or no law. In Christ was no sin: not only He did and knew no sin, but there was none in His humanity. Indeed He was born "holy," as Adam even when freshly created was not, but only innocent. When fallen, and not yet born of God, man determines without reference to God, which is nothing but sin, and, for those under law, transgression. In such circumstances the pretension to independency is the rejection of God and of His authority. When converted, the will is set right, though lusts remain, and deliverance in power is needed: life alone is not enough, as Rom. 7 teaches. But the renewed "I" always seeks to please God; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Natural man is Satan's bondman: this is not freedom; and one's own will is evil continually, because it is never obeying God.

Freedom from compulsion is of course allowed on all hands, save by infidel minds. Indifference is not truly the state of man, either natural or renewed, and indeed would mean no will: the one is inclined to evil, the other to good. Conscience is not will. It may warn, but is powerless. Grace alone acts effectually by faith.

In God only can we rightly speak of free will. He is absolutely free to do as He sees fit, and never pleases to do save what is good and holy. With the creature it is wholly different; his only place is obedience. God can create, the creature is acted on by motives. It is true that God never hindered his choosing the good, or compelled his choice of evil, any more than He made it impossible for him to fall. It is one thing to be free from external restraint, another to be free internally, which no sinner is. Man indeed never was the blank sheet which the speculative imagine: innocent, he was inclined to good; fallen, to evil. When converted and delivered in Christ, there is not only life, but power.

At any rate free-will has no sense, because there is no will till it be determined; free to will as to external compulsion is another thing, in that sense the will is free; but if I have a sinful nature, it is de facto inclined to evil, till I am born again. Conscience is another matter.

No being can have a will free, unless it can create, for otherwise it is always acted on by, i.e., is the result of, motives; hence, to say the will is in bondage is strictly true; morally, man unfallen had no will, for creature perfection is obedience; man, fallen, is governed in disobedience by corrupt motives, and thus is merely a sinner, and his will is under sin.

Inclination without necessity, is not tenable ground. Absolute indifference, to make man free, is absurd, for then will cannot be determined, but is a partially determined will - determined to good or evil; if to evil, it is a hard case to set it so, and make it responsible as a free person; nor is it more so if to good. It is not simple probation. Besides, if there be already an inclination, it shows that such inclination is a nature, not a will, and hence the whole ground taken is false.

But further, choice has nothing to do with freedom. A nature in perfect accordance with the order in which I am set, is free - such is called, morally, the law of liberty, when I will in nature what God wills in authority - so Adam, setting aside the forbidden fruit, was free in the garden, but had no choice to make; God chose to put a matter of choice before him, as a probation or test, but His doing it specially, and by this ordinance, proved it was not so otherwise. Nor is there any difficulty in God's full foreknowledge, only it supposes what is - our nature - and He supplies the occasion in which man shows himself without any influencing at all, and then God shows Himself in grace.

Arminius denied that man was beyond the power to help himself, and contended that he could by exercising his own free will improve himself, and that at least he had the power to accept the good and refuse the evil, to exercise faith in Christ, or reject Him. This is generally termed the doctrine of "free will." Whether Arminius realized it or not, his doctrine had much of the Pelagian error in it. Let us consider Pelagius and his doctrine.

Pelagius And His Error

The one solemn fact confronting omnipotence itself was that He had to deal with sin — with sinful men. He might, we might well conceive, have let judgment, swift and final, fall at once upon our guilty parents in the Garden of Eden. But His counsels of grace were not to be thwarted. Those counsels centered in His beloved Son, and must be fulfilled. Man is a free moral agent, and thus responsible. He is away from God, and must be brought back. He is not to be forced back against his will, nor will this wondrous work be effected without fullest opportunity to manifest the utter and hopeless alienation of man.

Throughout the word of God two mighty truths run side by side - God's sovereignty and man's responsibility. Man, in the narrow grasp of his little mind, is ever prone to lose sight of one or other; or, deeming them irreconcilable, to fill his eye with the one to the exclusion of the other; it is faith's office to maintain the balance; accepting truth in its completeness, as given forth by God, without pausing first to bring all down to the level of man's own small standard. From the plan of God's revelation; as from His counsels, neither of these truths is ever omitted; while in the fulness of His sovereign power and far-reaching wisdom, He governs all, orders and shapes according to the counsel of His will, giving no account of His matters unto any; triumphing over all the workings of evil; bringing forth higher and higher blessings out of the deepest falls and failures of the creature; everywhere gracious and righteous. At the same time, He ever gives to the responsible creature his full place in responsibility, throughout his actings; never treats him as a mere machine, nor fails to leave scope for the freedom of his choice; and for us to do other wise, in the interpretation of His Word, is of necessity to miss its teaching and go astray.